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ABSTRACT
ANALYST FOLLOWING, CAPITAL MARKET PRESSURE, AND REAL ACTIVITY
MANIPULATION
Melanie Maureen Rose
Old Dominion University, 2011
Director: Dr. Mohammad Najand

I investigate the impact of analyst following on real activity manipulation.
Because analysts follow firms and serve as information intermediaries, analyst following
should reduce earnings management through real activity manipulation. However, given
the negative ramifications of missing analysts' earnings forecasts, the fact that analysts
are watching and issuing forecasts might actually create capital market pressures as
managers try to ensure that they do not miss earnings targets. Because managers can
engage in earnings management through real activities manipulation and accrual
manipulation, I control for accrual manipulation in examining the relationship between
analyst following and real activity manipulation. I find that analyst following is
associated with more real activities earnings management.

I also find evidence that

discretionary accrual manipulation and real activity manipulation are used as substitutes
to manage earnings. These findings provide valuable information for model specification
for future research that investigates earnings management.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The negative market response to missing earnings targets provides a powerful
incentive for management to meet earnings forecasts. Ideally, meeting these targets is
accomplished through normal operational activities. However, these targets can also be
met by manipulating accruals and/or real activities which can negatively impact longterm firm value. Therefore, the existence of governance and monitoring mechanisms that
can effectively curb accrual and real activity manipulation are important.
Security analysts follow firms and provide market information and therefore may
serve an important monitoring role in reducing accrual and real activity manipulation.
However, because of attention to analyst forecasts and the negative market reaction for
firms that miss earnings targets, analyst following might actually exacerbate accrual and
real activity manipulation by management.

This paper investigates whether security

analysts effectively function as external monitors reducing earnings management through
real activity manipulation or whether they create capital market pressure which induces
more manipulation.
Theoretically, the alignment of the interests of managers and shareholders through
contracts and monitoring should make this type of manipulation unlikely. However, some
managerial incentive structures, such as compensation tied to share price or other
accounting variables, can create pressure to manipulate earnings. The costs associated
with this type of manipulation, whether in the form of reduced transparency about the
actual state of the firm or through the expenditure of non-value producing managerial
effort, can be detrimental to the long-term performance of the company [Gunny (2005),
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Graham et al (2005), Zang (2007), Cohen and Zarowin (2010)]. Although several prior
studies have found that analyst following is associated with higher performance measures
[Merton (1987), Moyer et al (1989), Chung and Jo (1996), Doukas et al (2000), Das et al
(2006)], there is limited research that investigates the contribution of analyst following in
reducing real activities earnings management.
Earnings management stems from management's ability to use discretion in
financial reporting. Managers routinely estimate future economic events, choose among
accounting methods for reporting transactions, use judgment in the management of
working capital, and decide when to realize or defer expenses. In this paper, I define
earnings management using a frequently referenced definition by Healy and Wahlen
(1999). "Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers."1 Therefore earnings
management can be viewed as an agency dilemma, especially if some stakeholders are
not able to recognize and appropriately discount earnings numbers obtained through
manipulation.
Much of the earnings management literature focuses on accrual management.
Accrual management is identified by abnormal levels of discretionary accruals.
However, managers can manipulate earnings through either accruals or real activities.
Rowychowdhury (2006) defines real activity manipulation as departures from normal
operational practices, motivated by managers' desire to mislead at least some
stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal
1

In this paper, I use earnings management and earnings manipulation interchangeably.
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course of operations.

Because accrual manipulation and real activity manipulation are

likely used together to obtain a desired outcome, both should be examined together. This
paper contributes to the literature by examining the monitoring role that analysts may
play in reducing real activity manipulation. The paper also provides additional insight on
the monitoring role of analysts in reducing accrual management which has been studied
previously in the literature, but not in the context of substitutability between accrual
management and real activity management. The results indicate analyst following is
associated with higher real activities manipulation as measured by the proxies in this
paper. In addition, the results confirm a substitution relationship between discretionary
accrual manipulation and the real activity manipulation proxies. This finding provides
valuable information for model specification in future research that investigates earnings
management.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature
review and a discussion of the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and variables
used. Section 4 provides detailed results of the relationship between analyst following
and real activity manipulation. Section 5 discloses various robustness checks. Section 6
summarizes the conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review and Hypothesis
Because managers have some discretion in accounting, including deciding when
to realize or defer income and expenses, they are able to affect reported earnings numbers
through accruals. Ideally, this discretion should allow the manager to provide additional
insight into the state of the firm that would not otherwise show up in actual cash flows.
However, as noted above, instead of providing additional clarity, discretionary accruals
can also be used as a tool to mislead stakeholders, to avoid the negative reaction of
missing earnings projections or to affect the outcome of some other market event. The
earnings management literature primarily focuses on actions to bridge gaps between
expectations and performance and to affect the outcome of capital market transactions.
2.1 Earnings Management and Performance
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Burgstahler and Eames (2003) investigate the
distribution of reported earnings scaled by market value and find a discontinuity around
the zero earnings threshold. The papers report a high frequency of firms with small
earnings increases and positive income and a low frequency of firms with small decreases
in earnings and reported losses. The authors attribute this discontinuity to earnings
management to report positive income gains. In these papers, earnings management
identification is based solely on distributional analysis.

A significant amount of

subsequent research has also attributed the discontinuity of the earnings distribution
around the zero thresholds to earnings management.2 Burgstahler and Eames (2003) also
find that firms manage earnings to avoid both losses and earnings decreases. In addition,
2

The following is a list of a few of the studies: Collins, Pincus, and Xie [1999], Degeorge, Patel, and
Zeckhauser [1999], Kang [1999], Easton [1999], Baber and Kang [2002], Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson
[2007], Gunny, Jacob, and Jorgensen [2007], Jacob and Jorgensen [2007]
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they find evidence that analysts fail to incorporate the earnings management that actually
occurs into their forecasts making it beneficial for managers to "game the system."
More recently, researchers have questioned the identification and conclusion of
earnings management based on distributional analysis. Durtschi and Easton (2005) and
Durtschi and Easton (2009) contend that the discontinuities around the zero earnings
threshold result from sample selection bias and scaling. Specifically, they argue that the
discontinuity is an artifact caused by elimination of observations with missing data. They
also contend that deflating earnings by market capitalization affects the resultant
distribution. They observe that the market capitalization of companies reporting a loss
tends to be smaller than that of companies reporting the same absolute value of profit.
Therefore, larger deflators for the profit firms will cause those firms to accumulate in the
smallest positive interval when scaled. For loss firms, scaling with market capitalizations
that are lower in absolute value than those for the profit firms will lead to less
accumulation of entries near the zero threshold.

Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) challenge

the Durtschi and Easton (2005, 2009) findings. By aggregating quarterly earnings over
periods ending in months other than the fiscal period end month, Jacob and Jorgensen
(2007) calculate alternative annual earnings measures. If there is earnings management
at fiscal year end to meet targets, the discontinuity should be more apparent for fiscal
year-end earnings numbers than for the alternative earnings periods. They confirm prior
findings in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) of earnings management to avoid earnings
decreases and losses in all scaled earnings measures. Their analysis also indicates a
discontinuity at zero in the distribution of unsealed net income. Although the debate
continues about the discontinuity in the distribution of earnings around zero and whether
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this discontinuity can be attributed to earnings management, other literature provides
evidence of manipulation through accruals and real activities.
DeGeorge et al (1999) find evidence that managers manipulate earnings to try to
"jump over the line." Using discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management,
they identify earnings management to beat two additional benchmarks- performance
relative to the prior comparable period and relative to analysts' earnings projections.
Dechow et al. (2003) also investigate whether firms that just met thresholds of zero
earnings and zero changes in earnings engage in accrual manipulation to meet these
thresholds. They find no significant difference in accruals for small profit and loss firms
and suggest that managers in the sample are instead using real actions to meet earnings
targets. However, Hansen (2010) provides another rationale for the lack of confirmatory
findings of accrual management to meet targets in the Dechow et al (2003) study.
Hansen (2010) points out firms may be managing earnings to respond to incentives other
than the incentive under investigation. After controlling for alternative benchmarks (for
example, earnings changes), Hansen finds that firms with small profits have discretionary
accruals that are significantly higher than firms with small losses providing additional
evidence of discretionary accrual earnings management tied to various performance
targets.
Other literature suggests that earnings management to meet performance
benchmarks is not accomplished solely through accrual management.

Gunny (2010)

asserts that manipulating accruals is subject to higher risk of SEC scrutiny. She looks at
R&D expense, SG&A expense, timing of the sale of fixed assets and overproduction
(discussed in more detail in section 3.3) as real activity manipulation tools. She finds a
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positive association between real activity manipulation and meeting earnings
benchmarks. Collectively, these studies provide evidence that earnings management to
meet benchmarks exists and also for the direction of this study in controlling for accrual
manipulation when examining the effect of analyst following on real activity
management.
2.2 Earnings Management and Capital Market Transactions
Researchers have documented valuation issues that result from earnings
management. For example, Teoh et al (1998b) examine whether aggressive incomeincreasing accounting accruals increase investor optimism about SEOs. They find higher
net income growth in the issue year for SEO firms relative to performance matched nonissuing comparable firms. Post-issue, they find that the SEO firms significantly under
perform their matches. They attribute the optimism that drives the market overvaluation
of SEOs to inflated earnings numbers garnered through accrual manipulation and the
underperformance to a market correction back to fundamental value. Miznik and
Jacobson (2007) also examine earnings management around SEOs. They find that firms
tend to inflate earnings numbers using both accrual and real activity manipulation before
SEOs and that the market also overvalues these firms. The long-run performance issues
associated with earnings management are also prevalent in the IPO market. Teoh et al
(1998a) also examine whether discretionary accruals predict the cross-sectional variation
in post-IPO long run stock performance. They find evidence that firms with abnormally
high accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock performance in the three years
following issuance. The stock under performance is directly related to the degree of the
accrual earnings management. They find that the most aggressive earnings management
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firms have three-year after market stock returns that are approximately 20 percent less
than the most conservative earnings management firms. Given the long-run performance
outcomes associated with earnings management, an important question is what
governance mechanisms can successfully mitigate the behavior.
2.3 Earnings Management and Corporate Governance
Prior research has examined the effectiveness of some corporate governance
mechanisms in controlling earnings management through accruals. For example, Chung
and Jeong-Bon (2002) find a negative relationship between institutional holdings and
accrual management.

Peasnell et al (2000) show that outside members on audit

committees and governance boards reduce abnormal accruals. Similarly Matsumoto
(2002) finds that firms with higher transient institutional ownership are more likely to use
discretionary accruals and forecast guidance to meet or beat expectations at earnings
announcement. In addition, Luez et al (2003) examine the role of investor protection in
controlling earnings management. They find that the quality of minority shareholder
rights and the strength of legal enforcement reduce accrual earnings management.
Collectively, the results of these studies suggest that effective governance/external
monitoring can reduce the agency problems of accrual management. This paper examines
the relationship between analyst following and various earnings management measures to
determine if analysts are successful monitors in reducing accrual and real activity
management.
2.4 Accrual Manipulation and Real Activity Manipulation
A survey study by Graham, Harvey, and Rajpol (2005) suggests that real activity
manipulation may be more prevalent than accrual manipulation. Eighty percent of the
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managers surveyed in the Graham study reported that they would decrease spending on
R&D, advertising, and maintenance to meet an earnings target. More than fifty percent of
respondents stated that they would delay starting a new project to meet an earnings target,
even if such a delay would be non value maximizing. These findings are significant
because they suggest that not only do managers feel significant pressure to meet targets,
but also that they are creative in finding mechanisms, other than accruals, to reach
targets. Further evidence of this is given by Chi et al (2011) when they find that higher
quality auditors and longer audit tenure constrain accrual management but with an
unintended consequence that firms resort to real activities earnings management. Other
literature suggests that the reliance on earnings management through real activity
manipulation may also be more prevalent because of the attention that investors and other
regulators give to accounting figures in the wake of major accounting scandals.
In a working paper, Zang (2007) investigates the relationship between real
activity and accrual management. She finds a degree of substitutability between real
activity manipulation and accrual manipulation. Specifically, she finds that an increase in
the cost of one type of manipulation leads to an increase in the level of the other type.
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) also examine the relationship between real and accrual
earnings management. They report that SEO firms engage in both real and accrual
manipulation and that as the cost of accrual management increases, firms engage in more
real activity manipulation.

Interestingly, they find that the decline in post-SEO

performance due to the real activities management is more severe than that due to accrual
management.

If the long-run performance implications of real activity manipulation
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expand beyond the SEO market, identifying mechanisms that can reduce this
opportunistic behavior is important.
2.5 Earnings Management and Analyst Following
Most of the recent research on analyst following and earnings management
focuses on discretionary accruals alone as the earnings management tool. Ahmed et al
(2005) examine the effects of earnings management on analysts' forecasts. They find
that analysts' forecasts do not correctly predict the difference in the persistence between
non-discretionary and discretionary accruals (discretionary accruals display less
persistence than non-discretionary accruals). If firms use accrual manipulation to meet
performance benchmarks in one period, this inefficiency in analysts' forecasts could
cause managers to engage in a cycle of accrual manipulation to meet future earnings
targets.
Degeorge et al (2005) examine the role that analysts play in either reducing or
exacerbating discretionary accrual earnings management. Across an international sample,
they find evidence that analysts are more effective monitors in transparent environments
than in opaque environments and also find that firms in transparent countries use shortterm earnings management techniques to reach the consensus analyst forecast.
Controlling for possible endogeneity of analyst coverage, Yu (2008) also examines
analysts' influence on discretionary accruals earnings management decisions. He finds
that firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less and the result is more
pronounced for more experienced analysts and for analysts from top brokers. Similarly,
Knyazeva (2007) finds that the effect of analyst following on firm performance is similar
to the effect of other corporate governance mechanisms and that analyst following is
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associated with lower discretionary accrual earnings management. A study by Sun and
Liu (2011) finds a positive relationship between analyst coverage and accounting
conservatism, defined as accounting that recognizes losses as they are discovered, but
defers gains until they are verified. This rule of thumb approach to recording losses and
gains reduces the case by case discretion that managers have over accruals. Their results
suggest that firms engage in less accrual management and choose more conservative
accounting methods when they are followed by more analysts than when they are
followed by fewer analysts.

Collectively, these studies suggest that analysts are

successful in reducing earnings manipulation through discretionary accruals. However,
more research is needed to determine if analyst following is successful at reducing
multiple types of earnings management behavior or if analyst following is associated with
managers substituting out of discretionary accruals as the earnings management tool into
other types of earnings management.
A recent study by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) provides some limited evidence that
analyst following can curb both accrual and real activity manipulation. They conduct
maximum likelihood estimation using an earnings management dummy variable as the
dependent variable. The earnings management dummy is set to 1 if any of their earnings
management proxies (accrual based or real activity based) is above the industry-year
median. They find a significantly negative relationship between the earnings management
dummies and analyst following.

While this paper does present some evidence that

analyst following can curb real earnings management behavior, the model estimated does
not take into account the interplay in the relationship between accrual and real activity
manipulation. An examination of analyst following on real activity earnings management
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that takes into account accrual management will provide additional insight on the
monitoring role of analysts. Specifically, this paper will provide insight on how analyst
following affects the interplay between accrual and real activity manipulation and
whether analyst coverage simply induces managers to switch between earnings
management mechanisms.
2.6 Hypotheses
Because model misspecification may be influencing prior findings on analyst
following and earnings management, I test that there is no relationship between analyst
following and real activity manipulation while controlling for accrual management.
HI:

There is no significant relationship between analyst following and real activities
manipulation.

Finding support for HI would be a significant contribution to the literature and provide
information on specification of models dealing with accrual and/or real activity
manipulation.
Failure to find support for HI would indicate that either the "monitoring
effectiveness" or the "capital market pressure" argument explains the relationship
between analyst following and real activity manipulation. In the monitoring effectiveness
hypothesis, analyst following is successful in reducing real activity manipulation. In the
capital market pressure hypothesis, analyst following creates pressure to manipulate to
meet benchmarks.
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CHAPTER 3
Data sources, variable construction, and sample description
3.1 Data Sources
Data sources for this paper include the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP), Compustat, ExecuComp, the and Institutional Brokers' Estimate System
(I/B/E/S) databases.

I exclude banks/financial firms, utilities, and other regulated

industries. Data on firm characteristics are either obtained from or calculated with data
from CRSP and Compustat. Analyst following information is obtained from I/B/E/S.
Compensation data is for the active CEO for the year as listed in ExecuComp. I use
annual data to pick up earnings management to meet annual earnings targets, a frequently
cited goal of earnings management. The sample data spans the time period from 19922006 with 32,117 observations across the firm-years.
3.2 Measures of Discretionary Accruals
Earnings management can be proxied using discretionary accruals. The methods
for estimating discretionary accruals range from calculating simple averages to more
involved estimation techniques. In most models, total accruals are calculated and then
separated into nondiscretionary and discretionary components. The most frequently cited
and used methods for measuring earnings management are the Jones Model (1991) and
the modified Jones Model (Dechow et al, 1995). First total accruals are calculated as
follows:
TA t/ AM = (ACA t -ACL t -ACASH t +A STDEBT t -DEP t)/At_i

(1)

where
TA is total accruals for the firm in year t;
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AC A is the change in current assets between year t and t-1;
ACL is the change in current liabilities between year t and t-1;
AC ASH is the change in cash and short term investments between year t and t-1,
ASTDEBT is the change in debt in current liabilities between year t and t-1;
DEP is the year t depreciation and amortization expense and
At_i is lagged total assets.
The following equation is then estimated as an interim step in calculating the predicted
value of accruals.
TAt / At-i = <xi / At-i + a 2 (ASALES t )/ AM + a 3 PPE t/ At-i + s t

(2)

where ASALES is the change in revenues between time t and t-1, PPE is gross property,
plant, and equipment, and all other variables are as defined above. The predicted values
of total accruals are calculated using the parameters estimates from equation 2a, but
adjusting the change in revenues by the change in receivables. This modification is
necessary because the Jones model treats revenues as completely non-discretionary. If
earnings are managed by shifting revenues from future periods, we need to adjust the
change in revenues for the change in receivables. Therefore the predicted value of total
accruals is calculated using the following equation.
PTA t = di / AM + d 2 [(A SALES t - AREC t )]/ At.i + d 3 PPE t / AM

(3)

where PTA is the predicted value of total accruals for firm i in year t, and AREC is the
change in net receivables between year t and t-1, and all other variables are as previously
defined. Finally, the variable of interest DA, discretionary accruals, is defined as total
accruals (TA) minus the predicted value of total accruals (PTA).
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In order to account for industry and economy wide influences on discretionary
accruals, a cross-sectional variation of the Jones model requires that sample firms are
grouped according to the two-digit SIC code. Equation 2 is then estimated for each SIC
group. Discretionary accruals for each firm are found using the same approach as in the
times series Jones model but with the parameter estimates from the respective SIC
groups. In this paper, I use the modified Jones approach to calculate discretionary
accruals due to its widespread acceptance in the literature.
3.3 Measures of Real Activity Manipulation
Real activity earnings management involves the manipulation of operating
variables such as R&D expenses and production levels. A study by Roychowdhury
(2006) uses deviations from abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses,
and abnormal cash flow from operations, as proxies for real activities manipulation that
result from the following manipulation methods.
1.

Sales manipulation- accelerating the timing of sales and/or generating additional
unsustainable sales through increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms;

2.

Reduction of discretionary expenditures

3.

Overproduction, or increasing production to report lower COGS.
With sales manipulation, the cash inflow per sale is lower than normal because of

price discounts or more lenient credit terms. As the additional sales are realized, total
current period earnings are higher but the lower per unit margins mean that production
costs relative to sales will be abnormally high. Cash flow from operations, (CFO) is
abnormally low and production costs are relatively high given the level of sales. If
managers reduce discretionary expenses (DISEXP) as a real activity manipulation tool,
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the firm will exhibit unusually low discretionary expenses which would translate into
lower cash outflows and a positive effect on current period CFO.

For manufacturing

firms, overproduction spreads fixed costs over a larger output and therefore can reduce
total per unit costs. The firm would show better operating margins because the reported
cost of goods sold (COGS) is lower. However the firm incurs production and holding
costs for the excess inventory that are not recovered in the current period which results in
higher production costs relative to sales level. In order to generate production costs for
non manufacturing firms, Roychowdhury (2006) defines production costs (PROD) as the
sum of COGS and change in inventory (INV) during the period.
In the CFO model, Roychowdhury, following Dechow et al (1998) in calculating
CFO, DISEXP and PROD, uses the following equation to estimate the normal level of
CFO:
CFO,/ AM = ao + a, (1/ A M ) + a2 (SALES,)/ A,., + a3 (ASALES,)/ A,_i+ s

(4)

where CFOt is cash flow from operations in period t, At.i is lagged total assets at the end
of period t-1, SALESt is sales for period t and ASALESt is the change in sales between
period t and t-1. Roychowdhury (2006) points out that it is customary to include a scaled
intercept, cti (1/ An), when estimating non-discretionary accruals to avoid a spurious
correlation between scaled CFO and scaled sales due to variation in the scaling variable,
total assets. Following the Roychowdhury approach, I also include a scaled intercept to
ensure that the mean abnormal CFO is zero. Including the intercepts allows the average
CFOt/ At-i to be non-zero even when the primary explanatory variables in the model,
sales and change-in-sales, are zero. He also includes an un-scaled intercept to ensure that
the mean abnormal CFO for every industry-year is zero. He finds that eliminating the un-
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scaled intercept does not materially affect the results. Abnormal cash flow is the
difference between reported CFO and the estimated value of normal CFO calculated
using the coefficients from equation 4. Similarly, discretionary expenditures, DISEXP,
(which includes R&D, advertising, and selling, general and administrative expenses) are
a function of sales and lagged sales such that:
DISEXP/ At.i = a0 + ai (1/ At.i) + a2 (SALESt)/ A M +a3 (SALESt-i)/ AM + s

(5)

and abnormal expenses are the difference between actual DISEXP and the estimated
value of normal DISEXP calculated using the coefficients from equation 5 above.
Finally, production costs are estimated using the following equations for COGS and INV.
COGS/ AM = a0 + ai (1/ AM) + a2 (SALES,)/ A M + s
AINV= a0 + ai (1/

AM)

+ a2 (ASALESt)/ At +a3 ( A S A L E S M ) /

(6)

AM

+ 8 (7)

Production costs equal the sum of COGS and AINV such that
PROD= a0 (1/ AM) + oi (SALESt)/ AM + a2 (ASALES,)/ A-i +a3 (ASALESM)/

AM

+ s (8)

Each of the variables of interest (CFO, DISEXP, PROD) are estimated and abnormal
levels are defined as actual values minus the respective predicted values. The two-digit
SIC code is used for cross section estimation.
Mizik and Jacobson (2007) use ROA and R&D intensity surprises to proxy real
activity manipulation.

Specifically they posit that firms that simultaneously report a

positive ROA surprise and a negative surprise to R&D intensity are likely to have
manipulated earnings. They find that ROA and R&D intensity are well approximated by
a fixed effects first-order autoregressive panel data model adjusted for firm specific and
time specific effects (Arellano 2003). Therefore they use the following models to
estimate predicted ROA and R&D intensity:
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ROAit = a, + cp* ROAlt_i+ 2 8 T* TIME(t) + slt,

(9)

RDlt = a, + q>*RDlt.i+ S 5 T * TIME(x) + e„,

(10)

ROAiM and RD,t.i are lagged values of return on assets and R&D spending respectively.
TIME(x) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if year is x and 0 otherwise. In both
equations, the variable of interest has a firm specific component (a,) and a component
that captures the broader economy (8T). A value of 1 on cp, the first order autoregressive
coefficient, would indicate that the series follows a random walk and a value of <p=0.00
indicates that the series returns back to its mean level within a year. Alternative models
of nested specifications do not perform as well as the model indicated above.
While the Mizik and Jocobson (2007) measure is appealing because it does not
force a specification on real activity manipulation, the Roychowdhury (2010) measures
are more frequently used in the literature. I use the Roychowdhury measures as the
primary proxies for real activity manipulation. My primary proxies for real activity
manipulation are abnormal production costs, ABPROD, and abnormal discretionary
expenses, ABDISEXP. Rather than including analysis for abnormal cash flow from
operations, ABBCFO, as a standalone proxy, I perform analysis using ABCFO as a
composite proxy due to some problems in interpreting results for the ABCFO measure.
Remember that sales manipulation (through price discounts and more lenient credit
terms), overproduction, and reduction of discretionary expenses all have an effect on
current period CFO. Sales manipulation causes current period CFO to be abnormally low
as fewer dollars are logged per sale on average. If spending on discretionary items is in
the form of cash, reducing these expenditures to artificially prop up earnings lowers cash
outflows and will have a positive effect on abnormal CFO. Roychowdhury (2006) also
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points out that with overproduction, the firm incurs production and holding costs on the
over-produced items that are not recovered in the same period. The outcome is that cash
flows from operations are lower than normal. Because the manipulation strategies under
consideration have inconsistent directional effects on abnormal CFO, it would be difficult
to draw definitive conclusions from the analysis of ABCFO as a standalone measure.
Following Zang (2007) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), I also create composite
proxies using ABPROD, ABDISEXP, and ABCFO and test the relationships with these
proxies as a robustness check. I use the individual components as my primary proxies
because the processes that generate abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary
expenses, and abnormal cash flow from operations are different, which may make it more
difficult to identify relationships for the composite measures. Tables 1 and 2 contain
descriptive statistics and correlation tables for variables of interest.
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CHAPTER 4
Models and Analysis
In this paper, I am testing the effect of analyst coverage3 on earnings management
through real activity manipulation. Because analyst coverage is associated with many
factors that may also affect the firms' earnings management decision, I control for these
factors by first running the following equation.
NAF= pi + p2 SIZE + p3 VOL + p4 Q + p5 RISK + p6 NAF (-1)

NAF is the number of analysts following the firm.

(11)

SIZE, measured by the natural

logarithm of the total value of sales, is included because Bhushan (1998) shows that
larger firms are more intensely followed by analysts. VOL, the volume of trading over
the year, is included because of the incentive that analysts have to follow firms that have
lots of trading activity. Tobins Q is a proxy for analysts' apriori opinion of the firm.
McNichols and Obrien (1997) show that analysts are more likely to follow firms for
which they have a favorable opinion because this lessens the probability that they will
have to issue negative recommendations. RISK, the variance of the daily stock returns
calculated over the current year, is included to capture the benefits of following firms
with greater volatility (McNichols and Obrien, 1997). Previous year analyst following,
NAF (-1) is included to capture competition among analysts in following firms and is
expected to be positive. The results are displayed in Table 3. The relationships for the
variables in the model are consistent with the extant literature. There is a significant
positive relationship between SIZE and NAF confirming that analysts tend to follow
larger firms.

3

In addition, the coefficient on VOL suggests that analyst following is

Analyst coverage and analyst following are used interchangeably in this paper.
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positively associated with the volume of trading over the year. Analysts' apriori opinion
of the firm, as proxied by Tobin's Q, positively impacts analyst coverage. The variance
of daily stock returns, RISK, is found to have a positive impact on analyst coverage
supporting the idea that there is an incentive for analysts to follow firms with greater
volatility. Not surprisingly, previous year analyst following, NAF (-1) has a positive
relationship with current analyst following. Overall, the model explains eighty-seven
percent of analyst following and all variables are statistically significant. The results are
consistent with extant literature.
Following the approach in Yu (2008), I use the residuals from the above
regression estimation as the main proxy for analyst following in the main equation of
interest below, equation 12. The residual coverage is the component of analyst coverage
that is uncorrelated with the controls in equation 11 and is the unexpected component of
analyst coverage. I perform OLS regression using the real activity manipulation proxies
as the dependent variables, residual analyst following, NAFRESID, as the proxy for
analyst following and include various control variables. To control for the relationship
between real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation, the proxy for accrual
manipulation, the value of discretionary accruals, DA, is included as an explanatory
variable.
RM =

a l + a2 NAFRESIDUAL + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE+ a6DA
+ a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA 4

(12)

4

Although not listed as a variable in equation 12,1 also run regressions including institutional ownership as
an explanatory dummy that is equal to 1 if the proportion of shares held by institutional owners is greater
than fifty percent. While the results that include institutional ownership are not significantly different from
the presented results, including the institutional ownership significantly limits the analysis because of the
number of observations missing this data point.
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RM represents real activity manipulation as measured by each of the proxies.
NAFRESIDUAL is residual analyst coverage, the component of analyst coverage that
cannot be explained by the controls in equation 2. Under the monitoring effectiveness
hypothesis, the relationship between NAFRESDIUAL and RM as measured by ABPROD
will be negative. However, if analyst following creates capital market pressure to meet
targets, the relationship between NAFRESIDUAL and ABPROD will be positive. The
relationship between NAFRESIDUAL and the proxy ABDISEXP will be positive under
the monitoring effectiveness hypothesis and negative under the capital market pressure
hypothesis. I have no prior assumption on the relationship between NAFRESIDUAL and
the RM proxies. M/B is the market to book ratio and is included to pick up growth
opportunities of the firm. I expect a negative relationship between M/B and real activity
manipulation because firms with more growth opportunities are less likely to engage in
earnings management. LTD, long term debt scaled by total assets, is included to capture
the influence of the presence of debt holders on real activity manipulation. I expect a
negative relationship between LTD and earnings management given the monitoring role
of debt holders in the literature. SIZE, measured by the natural logarithm of the total
value of sales, is included as a control because it is correlated with many of the variables
of interest.

If firms manage earnings through multiple channels, DA, discretionary

accruals, should pick up the accounting based earnings management and provide
additional insight on the relationship between real activity and accrual manipulation.
DELTA, the lagged value of the sensitivity of CEO option grants to price changes, and
VEGA, the lagged value of the sensitivity of CEO option grants to stock volatility, are
included to further capture managerial incentives to manage earnings. Therefore I expect
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both DELTA and VEGA to be associated with more earnings management. Descriptions
of how DELTA and VEGA are calculated are outlined in Appendix A. Table 4 presents
the results of the OLS regressions of the various measures of real activity manipulation.
The results from the OLS model show a statistically significant, positive
relationship between analyst following and abnormal production costs. Higher abnormal
production costs result from earnings management using the overproduction strategy.
Therefore, the results provide support for the capital market pressure hypothesis where
analyst following creates pressure for managers to manipulate to meet benchmarks. This
finding is important because extant literature has found that analyst following is
associated with lower earnings management through discretionary accruals. Given that
managers have discretion in determining whether to use accrual management or real
activities strategies, this finding suggests that analyst following might induce managers to
use real activity manipulation strategies more intensively. As a control, I also included
DA, discretionary accruals.

The significant negative relationship between DA and

ABPROD suggests that the two manipulation strategies are substitutes. The coefficients
on LTD and SIZE are also significant and positive suggesting that the presence of debt
holders and the size of the firm creates capital market pressure to meet earnings targets as
captured in the ABPROD proxy for real activity manipulation. Growth opportunities, as
proxied by the M/B ratio, have a significant negative effect on earnings management
through overproduction.
Table 4 also presents results for the ABDISEXP proxy for real activity
manipulation. A significant negative relationship between analyst following and
abnormal discretionary expenditures indicates that firms are more cautious with
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discretionary spending in the presence of analyst following. When reduction of
discretionary expenses is used as the real activity manipulation strategy, discretionary
spending is lower than normal.

In this case, the lower the value of discretionary

spending, the more likely earnings management to meet some benchmark is occurring. If
we assume that discretionary expenses are bounded at zero, the negative coefficient
means that analyst following is associated with a lower level of discretionary
expenditures. Either firms are abnormally cautious or analyst following creates capital
market pressure to meet some target. Discretionary accruals, DA, is positively associated
with abnormal discretionary expenses indicating that the two earnings management
strategies are substitutes (remember higher levels of discretionary expenses are associated
with less earnings management). Although not significant in this model, the coefficients
on LTD and SIZE are negative, suggesting that the presence of debt holders and a large
market may create capital market pressure to meet earnings targets as captured in the
ABDISEXP proxy for real activity manipulation. Growth opportunities, as proxied by
the M/B ratio, have a significant positive effect on abnormal discretionary expenses
indicating that growth opportunities are associated with less earnings management
through discretionary spending.
4.1 Endogeneity
I test the effect of analyst coverage on earnings management through real activity
manipulation. However, earnings management can adversely affect the information
environment, which might itself affect the level of analyst following.

Therefore, to

address the potential endogeneity, I use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. The
estimated model is as follows.
NAF= pi + p2 RM + P3 SIZE + p4 VOL + p5 Q + p6 RISK + p8 NAF (-1)
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RM= al + a2NAF + a3M/B + a4LTD + a5SIZE + a6DA+
a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA

(13)

All the variables are as previously defined. I use the exogenous variables and the
lag of the endogenous variables as instruments. Table 5 presents the results of the 2SLS
regression of the various measures of real activity manipulation. The results are
consistent with the OLS results. The 2SLS results show a statistically significant, positive
relationship between analyst following and abnormal production costs which provides
support for the capital market pressure hypothesis where analyst following creates
pressure for managers to manipulate earnings to meet benchmarks. The significant
negative relationship between DA and ABPROD again suggests that the two
manipulation strategies are substitutes. The coefficients on LTD and SIZE are also
significant and positive providing additional support that the presence of debt holders and
the size of the firm creates capital market pressure to meet earnings targets as captured in
the ABPROD proxy for real activity manipulation. Growth opportunities, as proxied by
the M/B ratio, have a significant negative effect on earnings management through
overproduction. This makes sense because firms with more growth opportunities are
likely to focus efforts on realizing the potential rather than in overproduction. DELTA,
the CEO pay-performance sensitivity measure is positively associated with earnings
management through overproduction.
Table 5 also presents results for the ABDISEXP proxy. A significant negative
relationship between analyst following and abnormal discretionary expenditures provides
more evidence that analyst following is associated with earnings management through
reduction of discretionary expenses. DA, discretionary accruals, is positively associated
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with abnormal discretionary expenses indicating again that the two earnings management
strategies are substitutes. The coefficients on LTD and SIZE are significant and negative.
This suggests that the presence of debt holders and a large market may create capital
market pressure to meet earnings targets by lowering discretionary spending as captured
in the ABDISEXP proxy for real activity manipulation. Growth opportunities, as proxied
by the M/B ratio, have a significant positive effect on abnormal discretionary expenses
indicating that growth opportunities are associated with less earnings management
through reduction of discretionary spending.
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CHAPTER 5
Robustness Checks
To capture additional information on the relationship between analyst following
and real activity manipulation, I perform the following robustness checks.

First, I

partition the sample to provide analysis for the post Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) period.
Cohen et al (2007) find evidence that firms switched from accrual-based earnings
management to real activities earnings management after the passage of SOX. Therefore,
analysis of the post SOX data could provide additional information on whether analyst
following is associated with less real activity manipulation. I provide analysis from OLS
and 2SLS regressions in tables 6 and 7 respectively. The post SOX results are consistent
with the full sample results.
For the post SOX OLS model, I observe a statistically significant, positive
relationship between analyst following and abnormal production costs. The magnitude of
the effect is similar to the full sample results. Again, this supports the capital market
pressure hypothesis where analyst following is associated with higher measures of
earnings management, in this case in the form of abnormal production costs.

The

significant negative relationship between DA and ABPROD again suggests that the two
manipulation strategies are substitutes. However, the magnitude of the relationship is
smaller post SOX. This may be attributable to a reduction in the use of discretionary
accruals earnings management in the post SOX period as documented in Cohen et al
(2007). The coefficients on LTD and SIZE are again significant and positive providing
additional support that the presence of debt holders and the size of the firm create capital
market pressure to meet earnings targets as captured in the ABPROD proxy for real
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activity manipulation.

Growth opportunities, as proxied by the M/B ratio, have a

significant negative effect on earnings management through overproduction.

The

coefficient on DELTA, the CEO pay-performance sensitivity, is negative but was
positive in the full sample results. Although I do not investigate the reasons here, it is
possible that changes in CEO compensation resulting from accounting scandals that led
to the enhancement of SOX changed the structure of CEO incentives.

VEGA, the

sensitivity of CEO option grants to stock volatility measure is positively associated with
earnings management through overproduction.
Table 6 also presents post SOX OLS results for the ABDISEXP proxy.

A

significant negative relationship between analyst following and abnormal discretionary
expenditures provides more evidence that analyst following is associated with earnings
management through reduction of discretionary expenses. DA, discretionary accruals, is
positively associated with abnormal discretionary expenses indicating again that the two
earnings management strategies are substitutes. However, again the magnitude of the
relationship between DA and the real activity manipulation proxy is smaller when
compared to the full sample results. This provides support for a reduced substitutability
between discretionary accruals and earnings management through reduction of
discretionary accruals post SOX. The coefficients on LTD and SIZE are significant and
negative. This suggests that the presence of debt holders and a large market may create
capital market pressure to meet earnings targets as captured in the ABDISEXP proxy for
real activity manipulation. Growth opportunities, as proxied by the M/B ratio, have a
significant positive effect on abnormal discretionary expenses indicating that growth
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opportunities are associated with less earnings management through reduction of
discretionary spending.
The post SOX, 2SLS model results in table 7 are consistent with the post SOX
OLS results. The model in panel 7A shows a statistically significant, positive relationship
between analyst following and abnormal production costs which provides support for the
capital market pressure hypothesis. The significant negative relationship between DA and
ABPROD again suggests that the two manipulation strategies are substitutes.

The

coefficients on LTD and SIZE are significant and positive providing additional support
that the presence of debt holders and the size of the firm create capital market pressure to
meet earnings targets as captured in the ABPROD proxy for real activity manipulation.
Growth opportunities, as proxied by the M/B ratio, have a significant negative effect on
earnings management.
The model in panel 7B shows a significant negative relationship between analyst
following and abnormal discretionary expenditures providing more evidence that analyst
following is associated with earnings management through reduction of discretionary
expenses.

DA, discretionary accruals, is positively associated with ABDISEXP,

abnormal discretionary expenses, indicating again that the two earnings management
strategies are substitutes. The coefficients on LTD and SIZE are significant and negative
suggesting that the presence of debt holders and size of the firm may create capital
market pressure to meet earnings targets as captured in the ABDISEXP proxy for real
activity manipulation.

Growth opportunities, as proxied by the M/B ratio, have a

significant positive effect on abnormal discretionary expenses indicating that growth
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opportunities are associated with less earnings management through reduction of
discretionary spending.
Finally, following Roychowdhury (2006), I combine the primary proxies
(ABPROD and ABDISEXP) with ABCFO, abnormal cash flow from operations, into
composite measures. Consistent with Zang (2006), I multiply abnormal discretionary
expenditures, ABDISEXP, by negative one and add it to abnormal production costs,
ABPROD, to construct the RM1 proxy. Therefore, the higher this measure, the more
likely real activity manipulation has occurred. For the next measure, RM2, I multiply
abnormal cash flows from operations, ABCFO, and abnormal discretionary expenses,
ABDISEXP, by negative one and add them together. Because the processes that generate
abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses are
different, composite measures may make it more difficult to identify relationships. The
analysis for the composite proxies, RM1 and RM2, is presented in tables 8 and 9 for the
OLS and 2SLS models respectively.
Panels 8A and 8B present the OLS results for the RM1 and RM2 proxies. The
relationships are consistent across both proxies. The results from the model show a
statistically significant, positive relationship between analyst following and the proxies.
Given that higher levels of the proxies are associated with more earnings management
behavior, analyst following is again associated with more earnings management behavior.
Therefore, the results on the composite proxy provide support for the capital market
pressure hypothesis where analyst following creates pressure for managers to manipulate
to meet benchmarks. This affect is moderated by growth opportunities, as measured by
the market to book ratio, M/B. One explanation is that firms with growth opportunities
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are less likely to engage in real activities manipulation because managers are focused on
realizing the potential of the opportunities. The coefficient on discretionary accruals
indicates a substitution effect between earnings management through accruals and the
real activity manipulation composite proxies consistent with recent findings. The 2SLS
results in panels 9A and 9B are also consistent with the previous findings in this paper.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusions
This study analyzes the impact of analyst following on real activities
manipulation, while controlling for the level of discretionary accrual earnings
management. The proxies for real activities earnings management in this paper are based
on using overproduction to lower the costs of goods sold to report higher margins and
reducing discretionary expenses below normal levels to bolster earnings. For each of the
real activities management proxies, I find that analyst following is associated with more
earnings management.

I control for time to ensure that these relationships are not

spurious across time. This results holds for all proxies in OLS and while controlling for
endogeneity, through the use of 2SLS.
I also find evidence that discretionary accrual manipulation and real activity
manipulation are used as substitutes for all real activity manipulation proxies. This
finding provides valuable information for model specification for future research that
investigates earnings management and is consistent with findings in Cohen and Zarowin
(2010) and Zang (2007). I also find evidence that the degree of substitutability between
real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation is lower for the post SOX period than
for the pre SOX period. I attribute this to a general reluctance to use accrual management
strategies post SOX due to increased attention on the accrual accounts from regulators
post SOX.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variables

ABPRODCOST

Source

Abnormal
Production

Calculated

Costs

ABDISEXP

ABCFO

Notes on Calculations

Production Costs minus predicted value of production
costs
PROD-PPRODCOST

Abnormal
Discretionary
Expense

Abnormal
CFO

Calculated

Discretionary Expense minus predicted value of
discretionary expense
DISEXP-PDISEXP

Calculated

Cash flow from operations minus predicted value of
cash flow from operations
CFO-PCFO

RMl: Abnormal production costs + (-1)
Abnormal discretionary expenses or
APROD+ (-1) ADISEXP
RMl
RM2

Composite
Proxies

Calculated

RM2: (-1) Abnormal cash flows from operations
+
(-1) abnormal discretionary
expenses or
(-1) ACFO + (-1) ADISEXP

DA

Discretionary
Accruals

Calculated

! • « • •.-.»>'

Total accruals minus the predicted value of total
accruals
TA-PTA

"i

•n:m'PPRODCOST

Predicted
Production
Costs

Calculated

Calculate parameter estimates of the following
equation and then use parameter estimates to calculate
predicted values
PROD= + a! (1/ A M ) + a2 (SALES,)/ A M + a3
(ASALESQ/ At.i +a4(ASALESt.1)/ At.i + s
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Variables

PDISEXP

PCFO

PRODCOST

DISEXP

Source

Predicted
Discretionary
Expense

Calculated

Calculate parameter estimates of the following
equation and then use parameter estimates to calculate
predicted values
DISEXP/ A M = cto + a, (1/ A M ) + a2 (SALES,)/ A M
+a3 (SALESt.i)/ A M + £

Predicted
Cash Flow
from
Operations

Calculated

Production
Costs

Calculated

Discretionary
Expense

Notes on Calculations

Calculate parameter estimates of the following
equation and then use parameter estimates to calculate
predicted values
CFOt/ AM = oto + a, (1/ AM) + a2 (SALES,)/ AM + a3
(ASALES,)/ AM+ S

Cost of goods sold plus the change in inventory
COGS+ AINV

Calculated

Research and development expense plus advertising
expense plus selling, general and administration
expense.
RD + ADV + SGA

CFO

SGA

Cash Flow
from
Operation
Selling,
General and
Administrativ
e Expense

Compustat

Compustat

ADV

Advertising
Expense

Compustat

COGS

Cost of goods
sold

Compustat

INV

Inventory

Compustat

SALES

Revenues

Compustat
re* ->
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Variables

Notes on Calculations

Source

Total Accruals calculated as
TA/ A,., = (ACA -ACL -ACASH +A STDEBTDEP)/AM
where

TA

Total
Accruals

Calculated

ACA is the change in current assets between year t
andt-1;
ACL is the change in current liabilities between year t
andt-1;
ACASH is the change in cash and short term
investments between year t and t-1,
ASTDEBT is the change in debt in current liabilities
between year t and t-1;
DEP is the year t depreciation and amortization
expense and
At_i is lagged total assets

Calculate parameter estimates of the
equation for each 3 digit SIC group

following

TA/ A,.] = d, / A M + d2 (ASALES,)/ A M + d3 PPE/ A M
PTA

Predicted
Value of
Total
Accruals

+ £

Calculated
then plug parameter estimates into the following
equation to calculate predicted values
PTA = d, / A M + d2 [(A SALES - AREC)]/ At.i + d3
PPE/ A,.!
\

CA

Current
Assets

Compustat

ACA is the change in current assets between year t
andt-1;

CL

Current
Liabilities

Compustat

ACL is the change in current liabilities between year t
andt-1;

CASH

Cash

Compustat

ACASH is the change in cash and short term
investments between year t and t-1,

STDEBT

Short term
debt

Compustat

ASTDEBT is the change in debt in current liabilities
between year t and t-1;

DEP

Depreciation

Compustat

DEP is the year t depreciation and amortization
expense

A,.,

Compustat

Compustat

At_i is lagged total assets.
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Variables

Name

Notes on Calculations

Source
3 digit SIC

SIC
SALES

Revenues

Compustat

REC

Receivables

Compustat

PPE

Gross
Property Plant
and
Equipment

Compustat

(3?

II

^Hft'£svHBMh&<*->J'r • '" "*££»£• •••" '*i'"

M4F

Analyst
Following

»•••* " / W W ' ^ P ^ W r ^JSaBT''

K

ra*ftf3£>w*£BMB*v8m

IBES

Number of Analyst Following

M/B

Market-toBook

Compustat

(Number of shares outstanding times share price at
fiscal year-end, minus book value of common equity
plus book value of total assets) to the book value of
total assets.

SIZE

Size

Compustat

Calculated as natural logarithm of total assets or
natural logarithm of total sales.

Q

Tobin's Q

Compustat

Sum of the market value of equity, liquidating value
of the firm's outstanding preferred stock, value of the
firm's short term liabilities net of its short term assets,
and book value of the firm's long-term debt divided
by the total assets of the firm.

VOL

Volume

Compustat

Total volume of trading for the year.

RISK

RISK

CRSP

Variance of the daily stock returns calculated over the
current year.

INST

Institutional
Ownership

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the percentage of stock
held by institutional investors is greater than 50
percent.

LTD

Long-Term
Debt

Compustat

DELTA

ExecuComp

ExecuComp

Long term debt scaled by total assets
Sensitivity of CEO option grants to price changes,
See Appendix A

VEGA

ExecuComp

ExecuComp

Sensitivity of CEO option grants to stock volatility,
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Variables

Source

Notes on Calculations
See Appendix A

37

APPENDIX B
DELTA AND VEGA CALCULATIONS*
This appendix explains the calculation of DELTA and VEGA. The calculation follows
the methodology discussed in Core and Guay (2002) and Guay (1999). The explanation is
from Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006).
Value and sensitivities for a single option
The option value is calculated based on the Black-Scholes formula (Black and Scholes,
1973) for valuing European call options, as modified by Merton (1973) to account for
dividend payouts.
Option value = Se-dtN(Z) - Xe-rtN(Z-oT(1/2))
where Z = [ln(S/X) + T(r-d+o2/2)]/oT(1/2)
S = price of the underlying stock
X = exercise price of the option
T = time to maturity of the option in years
r = log of risk-free interest rate
a = expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option
N( ) = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution
DELTA= the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price
= e"dtN(Z)*(price/100)
VEGA = the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock
volatility
= e"dtN'(Z)*ST(1/2)*0.01
where N'(Z) is the normal density function.
Value and sensitivities for portfolio of options
Fiscal year end value and sensitivities of executives' option portfolios are calculated
using the Core and Guay (2002) approximation method from ExecuComp data, which
gives the realizable value (the potential gains from exercising all options on the fiscal
year end price) and the number of options separately for both exercisable and
unexercisable options and details of the current year's option grant.
1. For the current year's grant, the Black-Scholes value and sensitivities are calculated
using the above formulas.
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1. For previously granted options, the Black-Scholes value and sensitivities for
exercisable and unexercisable options are computed separately.
a. The average exercise price is computed separately for the portfolio of
exercisable options and unexercisable options. This is done in two steps. First,
the realizable value is divided by the number of options, which gives the
average of (stock price - exercise price). Then this number is subtracted from
the stock price to arrive at the average exercise price.
b. For exercisable options, the time to maturity is set to three years less than the
time to maturity of the current year's options grants, or six years if no grant
was made in the current year.
c. For unexercisable options, the time to maturity equal is set to one year less
than the time to maturity of the current year's options grants, or nine years if
no grant was made in the current year.
d. The Black-Scholes option value, delta and vega is calculated using the
average exercise price and time to maturity.
3. The delta of the manager's portfolio of stocks and options is calculated by adding the
delta of restricted stock and shares held by the CEO to the delta of his options
portfolio. The delta of stock = the fractional shareholding * 0.01 * stock price. The
vega of the manager's portfolio of stock and options = vega of new options granted +
vega of all exercisable options held + vega of all unexercisable options held.
Following Guay (1999) the vega of restricted stock and shares is not calculated
separately.
* This appendix and data is taken in its entirety from Pennywell (2009).
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This table presents descriptive statistics. Accounting data are obtained from Compustat.
ABPROD, ABDISEXP and ABCFO are abnormal production costs, abnormal
discretionary expenditures and abnormal cash flow from operations, respectively, where
abnormal levels of all variables are defined as actual values minus the respective
predicted values. DA is the value of discretionary accruals calculated using the modified
Jones approach. RM1 and RM2 are the composite real activities manipulation proxies.
RM1 is abnormal discretionary expenditures multiplied by negative one and added to
production costs. RM2 is the sum of abnormal cash flows from operations multiplied by
negative one and abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one. NAF is the
number of analysts following the firm and M/B is the market to book ratio, calculated as
the number of shares outstanding times share price at fiscal year-end, minus book value
of common equity plus book value of total assets to the book value of total assets. SIZE is
measured by the natural logarithm of total sales and LTD is long term debt scaled by total
assets. DELTA is the lagged dollar sensitivity of the CEO's option value with respect to
a 1% change in stock price. VEGA is the lagged dollar sensitivity of the CEO's option
value with respect to a 1% change in stock volatility.
Variable

ABPROD
ABDISEXP
ABDCFO
RM1

NAF
M/B
LTD
SIZE
DELTA
VEGA

Number of
Observations

Standard
Deviation

15170
12646
15297
12558
12640

-0.0002815
-0.0005966
-0.0004516
-0.00475

11841
15393
15364
15392
15444
15444

10.92864
2.07548
0.18877
7.18434
724.85
64.38543

0.00573

Maximum

Minimum

1.23773
1.02945
1.14316
1.87505
1.82053
:,
Hfr'v3

-79.28614
-34.61654
-76.65733
-88.98814
-115.74879

7.68666
2.35945
0.17219
1.64465

1
0.29831

73.4

51.29405

0

-2.7181
250.19
0.02927

92.74367
51.80737
81.75821
90.23312
.81378
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105.09039
4.39409
12.65503
998.6
1579
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TABLE 2: CORRELATION MATRIX
This table presents correlation statistics. Accounting data are obtained from Compustat. ABPROD, ABDISEXP, and ABCFO
are abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenditures and abnormal cash flow from operations, respectively,
where abnormal levels of all variables are defined as actual values minus the respective predicted values. DA is the value of
discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones approach. RM1 and RM2 are the composite real activities
manipulation proxies. RJV11 is abnormal discretionary expenditures multiplied by negative one and added to production costs.
RM2 is the sum of abnormal cash flows from operations multiplies by negative one and abnormal discretionary expenses
multiplied by negative one. NAF is the number of analysts following the firm and M/B is the market to book ratio, calculated
as the number of shares outstanding times share price at fiscal year-end, minus book value of common equity plus book value
of total assets to the book value of total assets. LTD is long term debt scaled by total assets and SIZE is measured by the
natural logarithm of total sales. DELTA is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price.
VEGA is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock volatility.
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TABLE 2 CONTINUED

ABPROD

ABPROD

ABDISEXP

ABCFO

DA

RM 1

RM2

NAF

M/B

LTD

SIZE

DELTA

VEGA

1

0.22729
<.0001

0.85197
<0001

0.05024
<0001

0.01181
0.1881

0.01682
0.0595

-0.02871
0.0019

-0.01489
0.0668

0.00988
0.2242

0.0236
0.0037

0.00028
0.9729

-0.00138
0.865

1

0.32523
<.0001

0.01322
0.154

-0.017
0.058

0.01282
0.1494

-0.02121
0.0359

0.12067
<0001

0.03878
<0001

-0.12212
<.0001

-0.00736
0.4079

-0.04014
<.0001

ABDISEX
P

-0.22729
<0001

ABCFO

-0.85197
<.0001

0.32523
<.0001

1

0.16485
<0001

-0.01101
0.2195

-0.02145
0.0159

0.04266
<0001

0.01567
0.0526

-0.01198
0.1391

-0.01125
0.1641

-0.0018
0.8238

0.01506
0.0625

DA

-0.05024
<.0001

0.01322
0.154

0.16485
<.0001

1

-0.005
0.5918

-0.00552
0.5515

0.00873
0.358

0.00204
0.8093

-0.01037
0.2205

-0.00458
0.5881

0.01894
0.0251

0.00254
0.7635

0.01181
0.1881

-0.017
0.058

0.01101
0.2195

-0.005
0.5918

1

-0.68263
<0001

0.27899
<.0001

-0.03667
<.0001

0.02758
0.0021

0.52338
<0001

0.02987
0.0009

0.1682
<.0001

0.01682
0.0595

0.01282
0.1494

0.02145
0.0159

0.00552
0.5515

-0.68263
<.0001

1

-0.4045
<0001

-0.03522
<0001

-0.00591
0.507

-0.4882
<0001

-0.05925
<.0001

-0.22643
<0001

-0.02871
0.0019

0.02121
0.0359

0.04266
<.0001

0.00873
0.358

0.27899
<.0001

-0.4045
<.0001

1

0.0918
<.0001

-0.04164
<.0001

0.56017
<.0001

0.04134
<0001

0.32892
<.0001

M/B

-0.01489
0.0668

0.01567
0.0526

0.00204
0.8093

-0.03667
<.0001

-0.03522
<.0001

0.0918
<.0001

1

-0.1103
<.0001

-0.17106
<.0001

0.02081
0.0098

0.31153
<.0001

LTD

0.00988
0.2242

0.12067
<.0001
0.03878
<0001

0.01198
0.1391

0.01037
0.2205

0.02758
0.0021

-0.00591
0.507

-0.04164
<0001

1

0.0973
<0001

-0.03789
<.0001

-0.09454
<0001

RM1

RM2

NAF

SIZE

DELTA

VEGA

-0.1103
<.0001

0.0236
0.0037

0.12212
<.0001

0.01125
0.1641

0.00458
0.5881

0.52338
<0001

-0.4882
<.0001

0.56017
<0001

-0.17106
<.0001

0.0973
<.0001

1

0.055
<.0001

0.35402
<0001

0.00028
0.9729

0.00736
0.4079

-0.0018
0.8238

0.01894
0.0251

0.02987
0.0009

-0.05925
<0001

0.04134
<.0001

0.02081
0.0098

-0.03789
<0001

0.055
<.0001

1

0.19919
<.0001

-0.00138
0.865

0.04014
<0001

0.01506
0.0625

0.00254
0.7635

0.1682
<0001

-0.22643
<.0001

0.32892
<.0001

0.31153
<.0001

-0.09454
<.0001

0.35402
<0001

0.19919
<.0001

1
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TABLE 3: OLS REGRESSION TO GENERATE RESIDUAL FOLLOWING
This table presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression that generates
residual analyst coverage. NAF is the number of analysts following the firm. SIZE is
measured by the natural log of total sales. VOL is the volume of trading over the year
and Q is Tobin's Q. RISK is measured as the variance of the daily stock returns
calculated over the current year and NAF (-1) is lagged analyst following. *, **, and
*** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
NAF= pi + p2 SIZE + P3 VOL + p4 Q + p5 RISK + p7 NAF (-1)

Variable
INTERCEPT
SIZE
VOL
Q
RISK
NAF(-l)
R2

Predicted Sign

+
+
+
+/+
0.87

Coefficient

Standard Error

-1.07484***
0.29861***
0.000363***
0.11446***
0.39394*
0.86297***

0.23363
0.02865
3.11E-05
0.01481
0.19321
0.00567
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TABLE 4: OLS REGRESSION OF ANALYST FOLLOWING ON REAL
ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION
This table presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression that estimates the
effect of analyst coverage on real activity earnings management using residual coverage
as the proxy for analyst following. RM represents the various real activity manipulation
proxies as indicated in the table where ABPROD and ABDISEXP are abnormal
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, respectively. NAFRESIDUAL is
residual analyst coverage, the component of analyst coverage that cannot be explained by
the controls. M/B is the market to book ratio and LTD is long term debt scaled by total
assets. SIZE is measured by the natural log of total sales and DA represents the value of
discretionary accruals. DELTA, the lagged sensitivity of CEO option grants to price
changes, and VEGA, the lagged sensitivity of CEO option grants to stock volatility
capture managerial incentives to manage earnings. *, ** and *** represent significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The significance levels represent standard
errors that are heteroskedasticity robust.
RM =

a l + a2 NAFRESIDUAL + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE+ a6DA
+ a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA
Predicted
Sign

ABPROD
Coefficient
(Standard Error)

ABDISEXP
Coefficient
(Standard Error)

INTERCEPT

+/-

NAFRESIDUAL

+/-

-0.13048
(0.05999)
0.02575***
(0.00378)
-0.00699***
(0.00112)
0.06763***
(0.0198)
0.00375***
(0.000723)
-5.08457***
(0.42095)
0.8537
(0.0898)
0.00002166
(0.00010341)
Yes
.06

0.10801
(0.08894)
-0.06277***
(0.01522)
0.02753***
(0.00857)
-0.08767
(0.06744)
-0.00521
(0.00517)
9.91653***
(3.4142)
-0.02907
(0.11727)
-0.00032***
(0.00012)
Yes
0.08

Variable

M/B

+

LTD

-

SIZE

+

DA

+/-

DELTA

+

VEGA

+

Year Dummies
R1
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TABLE 5: 2SLS REGRESSION OF ANALYST FOLLOWING AND REAL
ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION
This table reports the results of the two stage least squares (2SLS) regression of real
activities manipulation and analyst following. 2SLS is used to address the potential
endogeneity between real activity manipulation and analyst following. I am interested in
the effect of analyst coverage on earnings management through real activity
manipulation. However, earnings management can adversely affect the information
environment, which might itself affect the level of analyst following. In the first stage, I
estimate analyst following (NAF). NAF is endogenized with the exogenous variables and
the lag of the endogenous variables as instruments. RM represents the various real
activity manipulation proxies as indicated in the table, where ABPROD and ABDISEXP
are abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses respectively. M/B is
the market to book ratio and LTD is long term debt scaled by total assets. SIZE is
measured by the natural log of total sales and DA represents the value of discretionary
accruals. DELTA, the lag of the sensitivity of CEO option grants to price changes, and
VEGA, lag of the sensitivity CEO option grants to stock volatility capture managerial
incentives to manage earnings. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels respectively. The significance levels represent standard errors that are
heteroskedasticity robust.
NAF= pi + 02 RM + p3 SIZE + p4 VOL + p5 Q + p6 RISK + p8 NAF (-1)
RM =

a l + a2 NAFFIT + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA +
a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA
Variable

Predicted
Sisn

ABPROD
Coefficient
(Standard Error)

ABDISEXP
Coefficient
(Standard Error)

INTERCEPT

+/-

NAF

+/-

M/B

+

LTD

-

SIZE

+

-0.10333
(0.039268)
0.001364***
(0.000424)
-0.00684***
(0.001472)
0.072121***
(0.15208)
0.005443***
(0.002061)
-5.11320***
(0.423805)
0.083823**
(0.038362)
0.000036
(0.000061)
Yes
0.06

0.066908
(0.074016)
-0.00235***
(0.000815)
0.026174***
(0.002888)
-0.09437***
(0.030355)
-0.01191***
(0.004112)
9.956167***
(0.841568)
-0.02646
(0.075436)
-0.00036***
(0.000121)
Yes
0.08

DA

+/-

DELTA

+

VEGA

+

Year Dummies
Rz
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TABLE 6: POST SOX PARTITION: OLS REGRESSION OF ANALYST
FOLLOWING ON REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION
This table presents post SOX (after 2002) partitioned sample results of the ordinary least
squares regression that estimates the effect of analyst coverage on real activity earnings
management using residual coverage as the proxy for analyst following. RM represents
the various real activity manipulation proxies as indicated in the table, where ABPROD
and ABDISEXP are abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses
respectively. NAFRESIDUAL is residual analyst coverage, the component of analyst
coverage that cannot be explained by the controls. M/B is the market to book ratio and
LTD is long term debt scaled by total assets. SIZE is measured by the natural log of the
total value of sales and DA represents the value of discretionary accruals. DELTA, the
lagged sensitivity of CEO option grants to price changes, and VEGA, the lagged
sensitivity of CEO option grants to stock volatility capture managerial incentives to
manage earnings. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively. The significance levels represent standard errors that are heteroskedasticity
robust.
Panel 6A
ABPROD = a l + a2 NAFRESIDUAL + a 3 M/B + a4 LTD + o5 SIZE + a 6 D E L T A + V E G A

Variable

INTERCEPT
NAFRESIDUAL
M/B
LTD
SIZE
DA
DELTA
VEGA
Year Dummies
R^

Predicted Sign

Post SOX
ABPROD
Coefficient

Post SOX
ABPROD
Standard Error

+/+/+

-0.04326
0.02128***
-0.00755***
0.04591***
0.00226***
-0.73283***
-0.01861*
0.000130***
Yes
0.46

0.00831
0.00126
0.000698
0.00425
0.000421
0.12841
0.01031
0.000012

-

+
+/+
+
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TABLE 6 CONTINUED

Panel 6B
ABDISEXP = al + a2 NAFRESIDUAL + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6DELTA + VEGA
Variable

INTERCEPT
NAFRESIDUAL
M/B
LTD
SIZE
DA
DELTA
VEGA
Year Dummies
R2

Predicted Sign

Post SOX
ABDISEXP
Coefficient

Post SOX
ABDISEXP
Standard Error

+/+/+

0.05458
-0.03888***
0.02796***
-0.02971
-0.00109
2.55658***
-0.05647
-0.00041129***
Yes
0.08

0.06416
0.00826
0.00763
0.05915
0.00425
0.90545
0.0771
0.00007939

-

+
+/+
+
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TABLE 7: POST SOX PARTITION: 2SLS REGRESSIONS OF REAL ACTIVITY
MANIPULATION AND ANALYST FOLLOWING
This table reports SOX (after 2002) partitioned sample results of the two stage least
squares (2SLS) regression of real activities manipulation and analyst following. 2SLS is
used to address the potential endogeneity between real activity manipulation and analyst
following. I am interested in the effect of analyst coverage on earnings management
through real activity manipulation. However, earnings management can adversely affect
the information environment, which might itself affect the level of analyst following. In
the first stage, I estimate analyst following (NAF). NAF is endogenized with the
exogenous variables and the lag of the endogenous variables as instruments. RM
represents the various real activity manipulation proxies as indicated in the table, where
ABPROD and ABDISEXP are abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary
expenses respectively. M/B is the market to book ratio and LTD is long term debt scaled
by total assets. SIZE is measured by the natural log of total sales and DA represents the
value of discretionary accruals. DELTA, the lag of the sensitivity of CEO option grants
to price changes, and VEGA, lag of the sensitivity CEO option grants to stock volatility
capture managerial incentives to manage earnings. *, ** and *** represent significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The significance levels represent standard
errors that are heteroskedasticity robust.
Panel 7A
NAF= pi + P2 RM + p3 SIZE + p4 VOL + p5 Q + p6 RISK + p8 NAF (-1)
RM =

a l + a2 NAF + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA + a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA

Variable

INTERCEPT
NAF
M/B
LTD
SIZE
DA
DELTA
VEGA
Year Dummies
R2

Predicted Sign

Post SOX
ABPROD
Coefficient

Post SOX
ABPROD
Standard Error

+/+/+

-0.02059
0.001294***
-0.00742***
0.050182***
0.003441***
-0.77102***
-0.02189**
0.000144***
Yes
.43

0.007978
0.000084
0.00046
0.003151
0.000397
0.102655
0.010027
0.000014

-

+
+/+
+
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TABLE 7 CONTINUED
Panel 7B
NAF= 61 + 62 RM + 63 SIZE + 64 VOL + 65 Q + 66 RISK + 68 NAF (-1)
RM =

a l + a2 NAF + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA + a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA

Variable

INTERCEPT
NAF
M/B
LTD
SIZE
DA
DELTA
VEGA
Year Dummies
Rz

Predicted Sisn

Post SOX
ABDISEXP
Coefficient

Post SOX
ABDISEXP
Standard Error

+/+/+

0.01572
-0.00181***
0.026843***
-0.03466**
-0.00449**
2.644375***
-0.04813
-0.00043***
Yes
0.05

0.052549
0.000538
0.00292
0.020722
0.002608
0.687321
0.066183
0.000092

-

+
+/+
+
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TABLE 8: COMPOSITE PROXIES: OLS REGRESSION OF ANALYST
FOLLOWING ON REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION
This table reports the results of the ordinary least squares regression of the composite
proxies, RMl and RM2. RMl is abnormal discretionary expenditures multiplied by
negative one and added to production costs. RM2 is the sum of abnormal cash flows
from operations multiplies by negative one and abnormal discretionary expenses
multiplied by negative one. NAFRESIDUAL is residual analyst coverage, the component
of analyst coverage that cannot be explained by the controls. M/B is the market to book
ratio and LTD is long term debt scaled by total assets. SIZE is measured by the natural
log of total sales and DA represents the value of discretionary accruals. DELTA, the
sensitivity of CEO option grants to price changes, and VEGA, the sensitivity CEO option
grants to stock volatility capture managerial incentives to manage earnings. *, ** and
*** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The significance
levels reflect significance using standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust.
Panel 8A
RMl = al + a2 NAFRESIDUAL + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA + a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA

Variable

Predicted Sign

RMl

Coefficient

INTERCEPT
NAFRESIDUAL
M/B
LTD
SIZE
DA
DELTA
VEGA
Year Dummies
R*

+/+/+
-

+
+/+
+

-0.25483
0.0894***
-0.03428***
0.14888**
0.00845
-15.43077**
0.14018
0.00032192
Yes
0.09

RMl
Standard Error

0.1387
0.017
0.0094
0.0743
0.0061
6.6788
0.2009
0.0002
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TABLE 8 CONTINUED

Panel 8B
RM2 = al + a2 NAFRESIDUAL + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA + a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA

Variable

Predicted Sign

RM2

Coefficient

INTERCEPT
NAFRESIDUAL
M/B
LTD
SIZE
DA
DELTA
VEGA
Year Dummies
R^

+/+/+
+
+/+
+

-0.14263
0.06413***
-0.03264***
0.11026**
0.01231**
-11.5494**
0.03393***
0.00028963**
Yes
0.11

RM2
Standard Error

0.0907
0.01561
0.00899
0.06771
0.00576
3.55719
0.11988
0.0001226
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TABLE 9: COMPOSITE PROXIES: 2SLS REGRESSION OF ANALYST
FOLLOWING AND REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION
This table reports the results of the 2SLS regression of the composite proxies, RMl and
RM2. I am interested in the effect of analyst coverage on earnings management through
real activity manipulation. However, earnings management can adversely affect the
information environment, which might itself affect the level of analyst following. RMl
is abnormal discretionary expenditures multiplied by negative one and added to
production costs. RM2 is the sum of abnormal cash flows from operations multiplies by
negative one and abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one. In the first
stage, I estimate analyst following (NAF). NAF is endogenized with the exogenous
variables and the lag of the endogenous variables as instruments. RM represents the
various real activity manipulation proxies as indicated in the table, where ABPROD and
ABDISEXP are abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses
respectively. M/B is the market to book ratio and LTD is long term debt scaled by total
assets. SIZE is measured by the total value of sales and DA represents the value of
discretionary accruals. DELTA, the lag of the sensitivity of CEO option grants to price
changes, and VEGA, lag of the sensitivity CEO option grants to stock volatility capture
managerial incentives to manage earnings. *, ** and *** represent significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The significance levels represent standard errors
that are heteroskedasticity robust.
Panel 9A
NAF= pi + P2 RM + P3 SIZE + p4 VOL + p5 Q + p6 RISK + p8 NAF (-1)
RMl = al + a2 NAF + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA + a7 DELTA + a8 VEGA

Variable

INTERCEPT
NAF
M/B
LTD
SIZE
DA
DELTA
VEGA
Year Dummies
R^

Predicted Sign

RMl
Parameter Estimate

RMl
Standard Error

+/+/+

-0.17612
0.003745***
-0.03278***
0.159897***
0.016878***
-15.5172***
0.135378
0.000376**
Yes
0.09

0.105829
0.001108
0.003929
0.041271
0.005589
1.145602
0.103427
0.000165

-

+
+/+
+
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TABLE 9 CONTINUED

Panel 9B
NAF= 61 + 62 RM + 63 SIZE + 64 VOL + 65 Q + 66 RISK + 68 NAF (-1)
RM2 = a l + a2 NAF + a3 M/B + a4 LTD + a5 SIZE + a6 DA + al DELTA + a8 VEGA

Variable

INTERCEPT
NAF
M/B
LTD
SIZE
DA
DELTA
VEGA
Year Dummies
R^

Predicted Sign

RM2
Parameter Estimate

RM2
Standard Error

+/+/+

-0.1026
0.002257***
-0.0311***
0.116573***
0.019562***
-11.5793***
0.031545
0.000331***
Yes
0.10

0.075681
0.000834
0.002953
0.031037
0.004205
0.860494
0.077133
0.000124

-

+
+/+
+
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